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**THE PUZZLE OF NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS:
THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGES IN UKRAINE'S BID FOR
NATO MEMBERSHIP**

by

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March 2007

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THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGES IN UKRAINE'S BID FOR NATO
MEMBERSHIP**

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The politico-psychological realm of international relations theory offers a framework to demonstrate the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations and thus explains the puzzling nature of Ukraine's relationship with the Alliance. Historically, NATO's perception of Ukraine focused on Ukraine's international behavior and foreign policy motivations, and this perception affected the forms of cooperation the Alliance proposed to Ukraine. Unless Ukraine is perceived as a stable ally, it will not be invited to be part of the NATO Membership Action Plan, and the main priority of Ukraine's foreign policy—full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions—will remain impossible. Being seen as a NATO ally, as well as reversing the Ukrainian public's negative view of the Alliance, is a major responsibility of the Ukrainian leadership. However, it is also crucially important that Western democracies keep the door open for Ukraine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE	1
B.	SIGNIFICANCE AND METHODOLOGY	2
II.	THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY	5
A.	POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH	5
B.	IMAGES, BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS.....	6
C.	THE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMIZING MISPERCEPTIONS	9
III.	THE IMAGE OF UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS	11
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	11
B.	INITIAL IMAGE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE	11
C.	UKRAINE'S IMAGE CHANGES WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM.....	13
D.	ROLE OF THE CHARTER ON A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP (MADRID, 1997).....	15
E.	FROM MADRID TO PRAGUE: UKRAINE DECLARES ITS DESIRE TO JOIN NATO (2002)	17
F.	FORGOTTEN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE'S IMAGE (2002-2004)	22
G.	IMPACT OF THE 2004 ORANGE REVOLUTION ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE AND THE REVIVAL OF UKRAINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP.....	24
H.	EFFECT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE	26
I.	CONCLUSION	29
IV.	EFFECT OF NATO MEMBERS' FOREIGN POLICY ON UKRAINE: NATO AND EU INTERDEPENDENCE	31
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	31
B.	U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE.....	31
1.	U.S. Policy toward Ukraine, 1991-2004	32
2.	U.S. Policy after the 2004 Orange Revolution.....	35
3.	U.S. Policy after the 2006 Parliamentary Elections	38
C.	NATO-EU INTERDEPENDENCE AND EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD UKRAINE.....	39
1.	France's Position	40
2.	Germany's Position	43
3.	The Importance of Polish Support	46
D.	CONCLUSION	48

V.	UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION: THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO NATO MEMBERSHIP.....	49
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	49
B.	POLL RESULTS	49
C.	MAJOR STEREOTYPES INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION.....	51
1.	NATO Perceived as an Enemy.....	51
2.	NATO Perceived as Seeking Ukrainian Territory.....	52
3.	NATO Membership Perceived as a Heavy Burden on the Budget	53
D.	RUSSIAN IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION.....	54
E.	CONCLUSION	56
VI.	CONCLUSION	59
A.	RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH.....	59
B.	THE WAY AHEAD	61
LIST OF REFERENCES		63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		69

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Ukrainian Forces Contribution to International Peace-keeping Operations on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia.....	19
Table 2.	Public Opinion on Ukraine's Integration into NATO (2002).....	50
Table 3.	Public Opinion on Ukraine's Integration into NATO (2006).....	50

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

This study analyzes the role of images in NATO-Ukraine relations, demonstrating their influence over the outcomes of domestic and foreign policy. After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine began a gradual rapprochement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) just as the Alliance itself reached out to Central and Eastern Europe, first with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and later through the Partnership for Peace (PfP). At the start of a new century, Ukraine faces considerable difficulties in its pursuit of NATO membership because of the complex link between domestic politics and changes in the state system in Central and Eastern Europe. Although NATO's Article X presents the possibility of membership, NATO is hesitant to invite Ukraine to join the Membership Action Plan, the feature of PfP that eradicates the final hurdles to membership. Ukrainian leaders repeatedly assert the nation's willingness to join the Alliance, stressing considerable recent democratic advances. Nonetheless, it appears that NATO does not see Ukraine as a potential member. The most popular explanation for this state of affairs is that NATO is not sure that Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO are genuine.¹

More than half of the Ukrainian population holds a negative image of NATO. Negative public opinion of NATO can be explained by several factors, including weak awareness of NATO, ignorance of NATO's post-Cold War transformation and anti-NATO propaganda. Given the negative public view of NATO, a national referendum on Alliance membership would probably fail. However, Ukraine's President Victor Yushchenko notes, "Euro-Atlantic integration is the priority for Ukrainian foreign policy and meets its national interests."² Given the inconsistency between the popular image of

¹ "Ukraine: Kyiv's Pro-Western Policy in Doubt," Radio Free Europe, 16 Jul 2006, available from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/a29ac932-4f29-4a8d-affb-ed8ca08d5d89.html>, accessed 11 January 2007.

² "Yushchenko Points Out Top Priority and Strategic Aims of Ukraine," *ForUm*, 6 December 2006, available from <http://en.for-ua.com/news/2006/12/06/150733.html>, accessed 26 January 2007.

NATO and the priority placed on NATO integration by the national leadership, reversing NATO's negative image must be a great concern for Ukrainian authorities.

The politico-psychological realm of international relations offers a framework to explain the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations as function of domestic and international policy and politics. Tracing the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations since 1991, the thesis explains how such images have shaped the framework of NATO-Ukraine relations historically, and addresses current images and their influence over the Ukrainian aspiration for membership in the Alliance.

B. SIGNIFICANCE AND METHODOLOGY

According to Yushchenko, membership in the Alliance will provide the necessary foundation for Ukraine's future as an independent state and active contributor to European and Euro-Atlantic security.³ If Ukraine continues to be a "secondary actor," even with "Distinctive Partner" status, the nation risks remaining a buffer zone between East and West—a new kind of *Zwischeneuropa*. This policy could lead to such disastrous consequences as the partitioning of the country, or its reverting once again to the status of a Kremlin vassal.

Persistent internal political instability in Ukraine affects the state's international behavior and negatively influences how it is perceived by NATO and its key members. The distorted image of the Alliance held by Ukrainian society, which greatly determines the national (intra-actor) level of behavior, puts the consistency and sincerity of Ukraine's leadership endeavors into doubt.⁴ These negative images might block the state's integration into NATO even if all membership-oriented reforms are successfully implemented.

There is a considerable U.S. literature on NATO enlargement, and a smaller literature on NATO-Ukraine relations. However, there are significant deficits in the literature, as Ukrainian academic writing neglects the role of images in the relationship

³ "Yushchenko Points Out Top Priority and Strategic Aims of Ukraine."

⁴ J. Thomas Price, "Behavior Modes: Toward a Theory of Decision Making," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 37, May 1975, 11, available from: <http://www.jstor.org/view/00223816/di976574/97p04667/0>, accessed 22 August 2006.

between NATO and Ukraine. Statements by U.S. officials, Congressional reports and other sources depicting the U.S. stance towards Ukrainian membership in the Alliance are of special interest in this thesis. The U.S. support of Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic endeavors serves as an example, providing empirical evidence of how changes in images result in changes in foreign policy.

In order to explain the choice of the cognitive approach toward the research and support the hypothesis, both primary and secondary sources are used in this thesis. Various academic works, including material by scholars on political psychology and the cognitive approach in political science, are the basis for hypothesis development and testing and aid in interpreting the empirical evidence. Primary sources, including interview transcripts, Congressional hearings, articles, and statements by NATO and Ukrainian leaders serve as empirical evidence in the assessment of the hypothesis.

Chapter II provides the theoretical background on the politico-psychological (cognitive) approach to the study of foreign relations and the decision making process. International behavior and foreign policy motivations as “construction material” for different types of images are given special attention in this chapter.

Chapter III examines the emergence and evolution of Ukraine's image since independence. Tracing the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations reveals the factors that contribute to NATO's view of Ukraine and how the country's image has shaped different frameworks of cooperation.

Chapter IV depicts and explains the stance of particular NATO members towards Ukrainian membership in NATO. Examining the specific views of key NATO powers on the further enlargement of the Alliance and Ukrainian membership in NATO helps to explain the divergence in their positions.

Chapter V describes the nature and sources of the distorted image of NATO held by the majority of the Ukrainian population. Negative public opinion of NATO is rooted in old fears and stereotypes and is nurtured by a widespread anti-NATO propaganda campaign in Ukraine. The anti-NATO campaign serves to maintain and increase the popularity of particular political parties and organizations in regions of Ukraine where

ethnic Russians are in the majority. This heavily influences public opinion of NATO and makes it difficult for the average Ukrainian to make a conscious, informed choice in the referendum on NATO membership. The urgency of the campaign to inform the Ukrainian population about Euro-Atlantic integration and its purposes is obvious. The current status of this problem is alarming but not hopeless.

In concluding the thesis, Chapter VI underlines the importance of images in shaping the formats of international cooperation and makes recommendations to minimize or eliminate the impact of misperceptions about the Ukrainian aspiration for membership in NATO.

II. THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

A. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH

This chapter provides a theoretical background for the thesis by explaining the relevance of the cognitive approach to the study of international relations and its applicability to the study of NATO-Ukraine relations in particular.

The cognitive approach focuses on foreign policy as a “product.” Concepts from political psychology are used to explain the role of images, perceptions and misperceptions in the outcomes of foreign policy. Virginia Sapiro defines political psychology as “an interdisciplinary academic field dedicated to the relationship between psychology and political science, with a focus on the role of human thought, emotion, and behavior in politics.”⁵ According to Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire, “the cross-fertilization between political science and psychology has risen to a modestly active level since its beginnings in the 1940s.”⁶ James Kuklinski stresses the dramatic growth of published research on political psychology during the last decade, noting that “the increased influence of psychologically oriented research is undeniable, which renders questions about its value to the study of politics even more crucial.”⁷ Although political psychologists are criticized for reducing politics to psychological phenomenon (which Kuklinski calls the only consistent criticism of the science⁸), their methods are workable, especially for studying the decision making process in the field of international relations.

In defining the cognitive approach, Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth also point out its unique niche in the theory of international relations. The cognitive approach, they say,

⁵ Virginia Sapiro, “Introduction to Political Psychology,” *Political Science* 267, 2000, available from <http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/sapiro/ps267/ps267.htm>, accessed 28 August 2006.

⁶ Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire, *Explorations in Political Psychology* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 26.

⁷ James H. Kuklinski, *Thinking about Political Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.

⁸ Kuklinski, 9.

assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and decision-making. Humans and policy makers are cognitive actors. To understand and predict behavior, we have to deal with the realities of human rationality, that is, with *bounded rationality*. Therefore the process of cognition goes beyond the pure concept of rationality in actors' behavior presented by the realist camp in the science of international relations and thus helps to explain the decisions, which can seem irrational from their point of view.⁹

Scholars compare such situations with molecules that seem not to follow the laws of physics, and thus require a closer look.¹⁰ According to political psychologists, behavior is one of the determinants of the images that appear and evolve in actors' system of beliefs. The system of beliefs, including images, serves as a filter through which the "drafts" of the decision pass and take shape.

B. IMAGES, BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS

It is obvious that the images or perceptions of an actor held by others are shaped in their belief system by judgments they make of the actor's behavior. At the same time, awareness of the actor's motivations is indispensable for analyzing the actor's behavior. Therefore, the analysis of images in the sphere of international relations must be supported by a parallel analysis of the important determinants of those images—international behavior and foreign policy motivations.

Thomas Price puts the notion of "behavior" into the framework of interaction.¹¹ For him, "the forms of interaction are divided into two categories (levels): interactor and intra-actor."¹² International behavior is represented as an interactor level of interaction. The second level, the intra-actor level, is a "nation-individual level of interaction, or interaction between a government and its citizens."¹³ The actor (the foreign policy

⁹ Kuklinski, 9.

¹⁰ Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth, "Behavioral Decision Theory: Process of Judgment and Choice," 1981, available from <http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ps.32.020181.000413>, accessed 22 August 2006.

¹¹ Price, 11.

¹² Price, 11.

¹³ Price, 11.

maker) “is dependent on the nation and is a subject to the nation’s jurisdiction.”¹⁴ Given the subject of this thesis, this approach deserves special attention. Membership in NATO has been declared a major priority of Ukrainian foreign policy. However, the national (intra-actor) level of behavior (persistent negative public opinion toward NATO) contradicts the international (interactor) level of behavior, which puts its consistency, persistence, and the overall sincerity into doubt.

Behavior is driven by motivations. As Richard W. Cottam says,

motivations in foreign policy represent a compound of factors that predispose a government and people to move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs... Motivations in foreign policy should be approached by developing a dispositional base, or list of *needs*, the satisfaction of which predisposes an actor toward various action patterns.¹⁵

One of the best known criticisms of studying motivations comes from the “anthropologist” of realist theory in international relations, Hans Morgenthau, who argues that “individual motivations for the international analyst are unknowable and hence a subject better avoided.”¹⁶ Cottam answers by arguing that, “although H. Morgenthau rejected the importance of studying the individual motivations, his prescriptions are founded on motivational assumptions that are basic to his entire thought: that collective man, like individual man, is power driven.”¹⁷

The importance of images and perceptions (and misperceptions) in international relations may be considered the stronghold of the politico-psychological approach. The most obvious proof of the importance of images can be found in the study of international conflict and conflict resolution. In this context, R. William Ayres points out that

¹⁴ Price, 11.

¹⁵ Price, 32.

¹⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1973), 6.

¹⁷ Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 31.

“breaking down the stereotypes and images which conflicting parties hold of each other is one, if not the main task for the process of conflict mediation.”¹⁸ He states that

by bringing conflicting parties together, providing clearer communication of each side’s views, allowing the airing of grievances, etc., they will begin to view each other less as adversaries and more as partners ... Change in perceptions leads to a lowering of barriers to conflict settlement.¹⁹

To provide a good example of the role of images, Ayres narrows his research to one type of the image—the image of the “enemy.” Studies of the enemy image are among the most powerful from the first generation of scholarship in political psychology. One of its most famous representatives, Ole Holsti, believes that “the concept of the enemy helped to end and sustain international conflict over time.”²⁰ However, although important, the image of the enemy is not the only one that deserves careful attention. Richard K. Herman and Michael P. Fischerkeller argue that while the study of images is valuable for the field of international relations theory, “theories of image that rest only on the enemy concept lack the analytical tools with which to make the differentiations between *threat-* and *opportunity* based motivational compound.”²¹ They propose a broader theory of “ideal images” that capture five different types of strategic perception: images of enemy, degenerate, colony, imperialist and ally.²²

Images are complex. The types of perceptions represent five ideal images, meaning that no perception of foreign relations actors can be limited to only one image. Nevertheless, the image of the ally is most stressed in this thesis. While the thesis argues that mutual perception and images in the sphere of NATO-Ukraine relations represent

¹⁸ R. William Ayres, “Mediating International Conflicts: Is Image Change Necessary?” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, November 1997, 3, available from <http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/4/431>, accessed 28 August 2006.

¹⁹ Ayres, 2.

²⁰ Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change* (Oxford, OH: Miami University Press, 1995), 55.

²¹ Richard K. Hermann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive Strategic Research After the Cold War,” *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer 1995, 416, available from <http://www.jstor.org/view/00208183/dm980291/98p0181k/0>, accessed 28 August 2006.

²² Hermann and Fischerkeller, 426.

important obstacles to the state's integration into the Alliance, it is also important to recognize the types of motivations and behavior by both parties that impede Ukraine's acquisition of the image of "ally" in the eyes of NATO—an image which it needs for successful integration into the Alliance.

C. THE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMIZING MISPERCEPTIONS

In *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis raises an argument for the necessity of minimizing misperceptions in order to make more grounded decisions in the sphere of international relations. In his view, a decision maker should be extremely vigilant because of the costs of various kinds of misperception.²³

The reluctance of specific NATO members to recognize the changes in Ukraine and support Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration endeavors provide empirical support for Jervis's argument. The ambivalence of France and Germany about the type of relations they want with Ukraine is a good example. Their reluctance to see Ukraine as a future member of NATO and the European Union (EU) and to provide their support is explained by their unwillingness to damage relations with Russia. Although it makes sense to avoid annoying Russia (and risking the loss of considerable economic and energy benefits), there are other undesirable consequences of choosing the wrong policy. First, without their important political and economic assistance to help Ukraine integrate into the family of Western democracies, the risk that Ukraine will return to the Russian orbit is high. A resurgence of Russian political, economic and military domination on the western borders of Ukraine and eastern borders of the EU is definitely not seen as desirable. Second, further marginalization of the Ukrainian democracy would undermine the EU's principle of promoting democracy and raise the question of the "finalité Européenne" in general.²⁴

²³ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 424.

²⁴ See "The EU's Human Rights and Democratization Policy: Funding Activities to Promote Human Rights and Democratization," available from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#9, accessed 14 January 2006.

Therefore, for research purposes this thesis concentrates on the emergence of the initial images of independent Ukraine and NATO in 1991, the evolution of those images, and their influence on the framework of NATO-Ukraine relations. The analysis of different NATO perceptions of Ukraine, Ukraine's foreign policy motivations and its international behavior during different historical periods helps explain the different formats of cooperation that NATO proposed to Ukraine. Also examined are specific NATO members' foreign policy motivations and international behavior which affect NATO's image in the eyes of Ukrainian society.

III. THE IMAGE OF UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

An analysis of the roots and the character of foreign policy motivations and international behavior of Ukraine during different periods allows judgments on the international image of the state. This chapter traces the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations and explains how different views on Ukraine conditioned the formats of cooperation proposed by the Alliance. This chapter demonstrates that Ukraine's readiness to meet the criteria of NATO membership will not guarantee the state membership if it is not perceived as stable NATO ally.

B. INITIAL IMAGE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

It would be a mistake to say that the initial format of NATO-Ukraine relations was shaped by the Alliance's image of the newly independent state. However, for the following reasons this fact does not undermine the main argument of this thesis. First, NATO-Ukraine relations began in 1992, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was NATO's initiative for all non-NATO European countries, including Ukraine. Second, the emergence of an independent Ukraine was not accompanied by a clear and specifically "Ukrainian" image which influenced its relations with NATO. Third, the decision to join the NACC was not based on clearly identified specifically "Ukrainian" national priorities and motivations for international security. Such foreign policy priorities and motivations were simply not identified.

The lack of clear foreign policy motivations is among the indicators of a "degenerate" image, according to the classification proposed by Hermann and Fischerkeller.²⁵ The degenerate image characterizes states where "leaders are more concerned with preserving what they have than with a vision for the future, states are less strong than they could be, and decision making is confused."²⁶ Although Ukraine did not

²⁵ Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428.

²⁶ Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428.

fit this image perfectly, the state faced a number of domestic problems which did prevent it from elaborating an effective and fruitful foreign policy strategy.

Along with a deep socioeconomic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited a set of problems which required considerable resources to resolve. Ukraine was practically left on its own with the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe, which required 20 percent of the limited Ukrainian budget to clean up contaminated areas.²⁷ Considering other factors like radiation and related diseases affecting almost 10 percent of the population, contamination of 2.45 million square hectares of fertile soil, and the like, it is hard to imagine how Ukraine, struggling with a deep economic crisis, could manage the situation.²⁸

At the same time, the Chernobyl catastrophe and its disastrous consequences were among the main reasons for Ukrainian authorities' unprecedented decision to get rid of the nuclear arsenal they had inherited from the former Soviet Union, the third world's largest. Although the initiative was supported financially by international donors, its implementation required considerable allocations from the state budget. In addition, Ukraine inherited 900,000 military personnel and abundant surplus military equipment from the Soviet Union. The necessity of maintaining and at the same time reducing such a huge military force also required considerable financial outlays, again from the scarce national budget. And these are only the major problems that Ukraine faces since its independence.

These and other difficulties characterized the conditions under which Ukraine established statehood and created preconditions for its further participation in the European security architecture. In addition, the state's ability to conduct independent foreign policy was very restricted. The Ukrainian state apparatus was manned almost completely by former Soviet Ukrainian communist elites. The new generation of Ukrainian politicians and diplomats was just emerging and did not participate in state building.

²⁷ "Chernobyl 'Costs'" available from <http://www.ecn.cz/c10/costs.html>, accessed 14 February 2006.

²⁸ "Chernobyl, Ukraine" available from <http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/site10a.php>, accessed 14 February 2006.

As a consequence, the Ukrainians saw NATO and its enlargement as similar, if not identical to, the position of Russia, upon whom Ukraine had been politically and economically dependent. The Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in 1993, with regard to NATO expansion, “the later, the better.”²⁹ Despite the fact that Ukraine on a number of occasions expressed concern about NATO enlargement, the Alliance prepared to expand into Central and Eastern Europe, and Ukraine was not a candidate for membership.³⁰

Therefore, the formation of an initial image of independent Ukraine by NATO was influenced by Ukrainian foreign policy's lack of clear motivations, priorities and strategy. Ukraine's obscure motivations and attempts to balance between East and West (so-called “multi-vector foreign policy”) are explained by the country's dependence on Western financial donor states on the one hand, and Russian energy resources on the other. Although Ukraine did not perfectly fit the degenerate image as defined by Hermann and Fischerkeller, the state's image at the time did share many characteristics of the degenerate type.

C. UKRAINE'S IMAGE CHANGES WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM

In 1994, Ukraine joined the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP). Two facts about this deserve special attention. First, this was the first independent decision by Ukrainian authorities in regard to relations with NATO. Ukraine became the first member of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join a major program for practical security and defense cooperation with NATO and individual Partner countries, earlier even than Russia.³¹ Second, official Kyiv provided NATO authorities with a Presentation

²⁹ “Materials for the DC Meeting on 15 September 1993,” Oxman to Undersecretary Peter Tarnoff “Your Deputies’ Meeting on the NATO Summit, Wednesday, 15 September 1993, 11.00 A.M., 14 September 1993.

³⁰ *Basic Papers on International Security Policy*, April 1996, no. 16, available from <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP16.htm>, accessed 31 July 2006.

³¹ “NATO-Ukraine Cooperation: Security Cooperation and Support for Reform,” 20 December 2006, available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html>, accessed 22 December 2006.

Document in which the political goals of Ukraine's participation in PfP were determined, together with arrangements to achieve these goals using means and powers allocated by Ukraine for participation in PfP.

Practically, this means it is possible to distinguish Ukraine's motivations in its foreign policy towards NATO since 1994. The motives can be discerned from the provisions of both the PfP Framework Document and the Ukrainian Presentation Document signed by the state leadership. Having signed the PfP Framework Document, Ukraine "resolved to deepen its political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area," recognizing that "stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action."³² The first Individual Partnership Program between NATO and Ukraine was established the same year. It consisted of practical events for cooperation in international security oriented toward concrete goals and results.

Cooperation with NATO within the Partnership for Peace Program opened a lot of opportunities for Ukraine. It was a unique opportunity for Ukraine to develop its own policy toward one of the most important security organizations in Europe and the world, independently defining the goals of cooperation and implementing them. This greatly contributed to the reaffirmation of Ukraine as an independent state capable of conducting its own foreign policy.

With the emergence of Ukraine's clear foreign policy motivations regarding NATO, it became possible to judge the state's behavior, which, in turn, contributed to how Ukraine was perceived by NATO. The seriousness of Ukrainian intent was reinforced by the state's actual behavior. For example, in 1995, the year after Ukraine joined the PfP program, the Ukrainian Army's 240th Special Forces Mechanized Infantry Battalion went to Sarajevo for the peacekeeping mission. This made Ukraine a force contributor to the NATO-led operation to carry out the UN resolution in the former Yugoslavia (Implementation Force, IFOR, 1995-1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Later,

³² Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 10 January 1994, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm>, accessed 15 December 2006.

Ukraine contributed a mechanized infantry battalion to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and made available a helicopter squadron. This was not Ukraine's first peacekeeping experience since independence, but it was the first time the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed missions within the NATO format and according to NATO operational procedures.

The initiation of practical cooperation between NATO and Ukraine based on clearly defined foreign policy motivations eliminated the near-degenerate image of Ukraine held by NATO. For NATO, Ukraine became a contributor, a state which implemented important security tasks in cooperation with the Alliance. For Ukraine, cooperation with NATO became an important direction for foreign policy and contributed to stability in the area, which is only 400 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and the concrete results of its cooperation with NATO reaffirmed Ukraine as an independent international actor with a foreign policy supported by clear motivations and appropriate international behavior. This, in turn, contributed to the evolution of the image of Ukraine in the eyes of NATO. An earlier image, unclear, close to degenerate, was replaced by a new image—the image of a “partner.”

D. ROLE OF THE CHARTER ON A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP (MADRID, 1997)

After the fruitful and mutually beneficial relationship that began with the PfP program, NATO changed its perception of Ukraine. Ukraine's new image as a partner and its appropriate international behavior pushed the Alliance to seek enhanced cooperation with the state. Its strategic geographic location, considerable military potential and strong political will to develop as a democratic state also played an important role in this regard.

In 1997 NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana said, in a statement preceding the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine in Madrid on July 9, 1997,

The Alliance acknowledges that Ukraine has an important and even unique place in the European security order. An independent democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors of stability and security in Europe. Its geographical position gives it a major role and responsibility. NATO attaches a special importance to its relationship with Ukraine.³³

After the Charter was signed Ukraine entered a new era of cooperation with NATO. This cooperation was specifically shaped for Ukraine and was influenced by the evolution of the Ukrainian image held by NATO. Of course, the strategic geographic location of Ukraine, its political and military potential played an important role. But again, the status of a distinctive partner and the benefits related to this status could not become a reality without positive changes in how Ukraine was perceived.

Two facts support this argument and thus the main hypothesis of this paper. First, in 1992, when Ukraine joined North Atlantic Cooperation Council, it had the same geographic location and potential for becoming an active contributor to stability in the Euro-Atlantic security area. However, NATO did not propose any cooperation specifically shaped for Ukraine at that time because the future of Ukraine and its foreign policy priorities and motivations were unclear. Second, Ukraine's clear foreign policy motivations, supported by appropriate international behavior, were recognized by NATO and became preconditions for offering the status of Distinctive Partner in 1997. As stated in the Charter, NATO

welcome[s] the progress achieved by Ukraine and look[s] forward to further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration with the full range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures.³⁴

³³ Xavier Solana, NATO Secretary General, Speech at the Madrid Summit, 7 May 1997, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970507a.htm>, accessed 30 January 2006.

³⁴ *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine*, Madrid, 9 July 1997, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm>, accessed 30 January 2006.

Therefore, NATO recognized Ukraine's progress. Noting in the same document its appreciation of Ukraine's active cooperation with IFOR/SFOR and other peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, NATO underlined the importance of the state's international behavior.³⁵

To summarize, NATO's proposal to further develop its relationship with Ukraine based on distinctive partnership principles resulted from NATO's recognition of Ukraine's clear foreign policy motivations and appropriate international behavior. As noted above, a state's foreign policy motivations and international behavior are important determinants of its image. Therefore, the change in the relationship between NATO and Ukraine and the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership were influenced by the changing image of Ukraine from a near-degenerate state to a partner.

E. FROM MADRID TO PRAGUE: UKRAINE DECLARES ITS DESIRE TO JOIN NATO (2002)

The next important event in NATO-Ukraine relations came on May 23, 2002, when the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Defense and Security Council, Yevhen Marchuk, announced Ukraine's intention to seek NATO membership. Although the possibility of Ukrainian membership in the Alliance had already been discussed by various interested groups, this announcement by a high Ukrainian official was unexpected. Ukraine's ambitions were given a cautious welcome when NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, head of a North Atlantic Council delegation, arrived in Kyiv on July 9; however, Robertson warned that "membership was at least five years away."³⁶ NATO-Ukraine relations in 2002 were far from those typical of potential allies, and the image of Ukraine held by NATO was far from the image of an ally.

In fact, after the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was signed, NATO-Ukraine cooperation was significantly enhanced and brought even more valuable results. Sessions of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, conducted at least twice each year in the format "NATO plus Ukraine", became a unique forum for consultations that greatly contributed

³⁵ *Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine*.

³⁶ *East European Constitutional Review*, Volume 11, Number 3, Summer 2002, available from <http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol11num3/constitutionwatch/ukraine.html>, accessed 20 June 2006.

to building confidence and increasing transparency in NATO-Ukraine relations. For NATO, Ukraine ceased to represent an area of uncertainty, and “[s]trong, independent, stable and democratic Ukraine became a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security.”³⁷ For Ukraine, the Charter opened opportunities to get Alliance assistance in different spheres of state development and reaffirmed Ukraine's role as a key European actor in the security sphere. The new framework of cooperation allowed the conduct of a number of activities in the “NATO plus Ukraine” format, including joint seminars, working groups and meetings on topics such as civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, defense planning, budgeting, policy, strategy, national security concepts and defense conversion. Ukrainian endeavors to develop as a stable, independent, and democratic state were welcomed and greatly supported by NATO.³⁸

While Ukraine received valuable assistance from NATO, it also made active contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. NATO benefited from Ukraine's expertise in science and its contributions to peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans.³⁹ Ukrainian contributions to international peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia provide a clear example.

Period	Missions	Forces Contributed
1992 – 1995	UNPROFOR	240 th Detached Special Battalion 60 th Detached Special Battalion 40 th Operative Group of staff officers Military Police Unit Group of Military Observers since 1995
1995 – 1999	IFOR/SFOR	240 th Detached Special Battalion
1996 – 1998	UN Mission to Eastern Slavonia	17 Detached Helicopter Squadron 70 Detached Armored Company 64 Detached Special Mechanized Company 8 Detached Helicopter Squadron 15 Detached Helicopter Unit

³⁷ *NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners*.

³⁸ *NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners*.

³⁹ *NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners*.

Period	Missions	Forces Contributed
1999 – present	KFOR	UKRPOLBAT (Ukrainian contingent within the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion in Kosovo)
Source: The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history		

Table 1. Ukrainian Forces Contribution to International Peace-keeping Operations on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

The new cooperation format created unique opportunities that Ukraine used for its rapprochement with NATO. The Ukrainian military performed their missions in close cooperation with their NATO colleagues. In the case of KFOR missions in Kosovo, the Ukrainian military acquired valuable experience of interoperability with NATO forces as a part of UKRPOLBAT. The foreign policy motivations of Ukraine, its dedication to insuring regional peace and stability and its international behavior all contributed to its new image of a strategic partner and potential ally.

However, Ukraine's active rapprochement with NATO lost momentum after 2000, when it faced both internal and external obstacles. Power shifts in Russia and Vladimir Putin's presidency marked the beginning of considerable changes in Russian foreign policy, including its policy toward NATO enlargement. Under the Russian presidency of Boris Yeltsin, from 1991 to 1999, Ukraine, with its heavy economic dependence on Russian energy resources, did not face serious obstacles in developing an independent foreign policy towards NATO. Yeltsin did not object strongly to the first wave of NATO enlargement at the end of the Cold War, which incorporated the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and he did not interfere in NATO-Ukraine relations. When Putin, less tolerant of NATO, came to power, Russian energy supplies to Ukraine became a tool to influence Ukrainian foreign policy. Therefore, starting in 2000, the rapprochement between Ukraine and NATO faced an external obstacle, the Russians, which produced a partial drift of Ukrainian foreign policy priorities back to the East.

⁴⁰ “The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations,” available from <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history>, accessed 22 November 2006.

This Eastward drift of Ukrainian foreign policy was conditioned by the emergence of new motivations to preserve good relations with Russia for the sake of Ukraine's further economic development. This fact, along with Ukrainian energy dependence, meant that Russia remained Ukraine's major trading partner and market as of 2001.⁴¹ The authorities' failure to diversify Ukraine's energy sources and markets and to reduce its economic dependence on Russia after 1991 made it necessary to appease Russia, which under Putin's leadership strongly opposed Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO.

As a consequence, NATO-Ukraine relations slowed considerably and in 2000 began to deteriorate due to a series of scandals involving former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. The first signs of international scandal emerged with suspicions that Kuchma had personally authorized the sale of a Kulchuga radar system, which can track all existing aircraft without detection, to Iraq in July 2000, only two months after U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Kyiv to cement the U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership.⁴² The scandal, dubbed “Kolchuga-gate,” broke out when a former Ukrainian Presidential Guard officer, Major Melnichenko, made public audio tapes of Kuchma authorizing other state officials to sell Kulchugas to Iraq. Although the deal was never proven, Kuchma's reluctance to clarify the situation and his confrontational behavior considerably complicated Ukrainian relations with the West and especially the U.S. As former deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Vasyl Baziv, noted, Ukraine categorically refused to accept such a tone in its relations with the West.⁴³

Another disturbing scandal erupted in September of the same year, with the disappearance of Georgiy Gongadze, a Ukrainian journalist famous for investigating

⁴¹ Hutchinson Country Facts: Ukraine, available from <http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/countryfacts/ukraine.html>, accessed 28 August 2006.

⁴² “Ukraine Turns Down Early Membership Prospect In NATO,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume 1, Issue 43, 1 July 2004, available from http://www.jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3005&article_id=2368187, accessed 15 November 2006.

⁴³ “Ukraine Turns Down Early Membership Prospect in NATO.”

government corruption. The same audio tapes made public by Melnichenko contained a conversation between Kuchma and former Minister of Interior General Kravchenko in which they discussed the necessity of doing something about Gongadze.

Of course, the West could not tolerate the situation in Ukraine. It became clear that Ukraine under Kuchma and his semi-totalitarian regime was not a candidate to join the Western democratic regimes and NATO. Ukraine was very close to being considered a rogue state in Kuchma's second presidential term. His strategy of blaming the West for its unwillingness to consider Ukraine as a future ally led to so-called "Kuchma fatigue," the refusal of NATO and the EU to consider Ukrainian integration while Kuchma was in office.⁴⁴ For example, Kuchma was not invited to attend the 2002 Prague NATO summit meetings. It was decided that the NATO-Ukraine Commission, traditionally held during the summit, would be conducted by foreign ministers in order to avoid Kuchma's presence. Although Kuchma made a unilateral decision to go to Prague anyway, he was not welcome and no official meetings were held with him.

Ukrainian authorities declared their aspirations to join NATO in May 2002, knowing that NATO would not under any circumstances invite Ukraine to the Membership Action Plan during the Prague summit. This might be considered a tricky political move by Kuchma to maintain his legitimacy with the Ukrainian population by blaming the West for marginalizing Ukraine.

Two weeks after Ukraine declared its intentions to join NATO, on a visit to Kyiv on July 9, 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated, "The task before us now is to concentrate on building upon and enhancing our Distinctive Partnership ...A lot will depend on Ukraine's resolve to take reforms forward. But we are ready to go as far as Ukraine can."⁴⁵ The Ukrainian declaration of its NATO membership aspirations was not ignored by the Alliance. Both sides were waiting for the approaching NATO summit. Ukraine was expecting the reaction of NATO, and NATO, although not planning to

⁴⁴ Taras Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?" *Occasional Papers*, No. 47, November 2003, available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ47.pdf>, accessed 20 November 2006.

⁴⁵ "Celebrating Five Years of NATO-Ukraine Partnership," 10 July 2002, available from <http://152.152.96.1/docu/update/2002/07-july/e0709a.htm>, accessed 26 November 2006.

invite Ukraine, had to change its strategy to develop relations with Ukraine based on new realities. As expected, everything fell into place at the NATO summit in Prague.

F. FORGOTTEN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE'S IMAGE (2002-2004)

After the summit in Prague, NATO-Ukraine relations entered a new era. As predicted, Ukraine was not invited to the Membership Action Plan. At the same time, the Alliance reacted to the Ukrainian declaration by signing the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (NUAC). The NUAC, although lacking a clear position on Ukrainian membership in NATO, is similar in content to the NATO Membership Action Plan. It contains principles and objectives which, if implemented by the state, prepare it to meet all the criteria of NATO membership. Thus NATO kept the door open for Ukraine, but not with Kuchma in the President's office.

Launching the new format for cooperation and signing NUAC tested the seriousness of Ukrainian intentions. As the document states,

the purpose of the Action Plan is *to identify clearly* Ukraine's strategic *objectives and priorities* in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and to provide a strategic framework for existing and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the Charter.

After signing the Action Plan, Kyiv could no longer refer to external reasons for its failure to integrate into NATO and the family of Western democracies. Everything depended on Kyiv and its progress in implementing the provisions of the Plan. The provisions included strengthening democracy and the rule of law; respect for human rights; the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence; democratic elections in accordance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) norms; political pluralism; freedom of speech and press; respect for the rights for national and ethnic minorities, and non-discrimination on political, religious or ethnic grounds as well as adoption of all relevant legislation in pursuit of these objectives.⁴⁶ As

⁴⁶ *NATO-Ukraine Action Plan*, Prague, 22 November 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm>, accessed 12 December 2006.

events demonstrate, Kyiv failed to implement its own ambitions. Kuchma's highly corrupt oligarchic power regime not only doomed democratic reform, but threatened also to turn Ukraine into a rogue state.

Having damaged Ukraine's good relationship with the West, Kuchma turned his attention back to Russia. Official Kyiv's new foreign policy motivations and its drift to the East were accompanied by changes in the state's international behavior. Instead of adapting internal economic legislation to Euro-Atlantic norms and practice, thereby implementing its commitments under NUAP, the government became active in creating the Common Economic Space (CES) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.⁴⁷ However, Kuchma's new policy did not bring the anticipated positive results. Moreover, in November 2003, Russia and Ukraine faced the most serious crisis in their history. The island of Tuzla in the Black Sea became a bone of contention in Ukraine-Russia relations after Moscow expressed doubts about Ukraine's claim to the island. In the terms of multi-vector (East and West) foreign policy, official Kyiv failed to improve its relations with West and did not achieve much in its relations with the East.

Overall, Ukrainian foreign policy motivations in 2000-2004 were characterized by lack of clarity. Ukraine's international behavior under Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy was characterized by a return to the practice of balancing between the West and the East. Seeking protection under the Western "umbrella" and support in its problematic relations with Russia, and at the same time seeking room under the Russian "umbrella" in case of confrontation with the West, Ukraine's government found itself in a situation similar to 1991, aggravated by international political isolation. Its unclear foreign policy motivations and unpredictable international behavior contributed to the reversion of Ukraine's image to that of a near-degenerate state. Consequently, Ukraine lost a unique opportunity for gradual integration into NATO proposed in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. It was clear that NATO would not consider Ukrainian membership until the end of Kuchma's presidency and Kyiv's unclear policy of balancing between West and East.

⁴⁷ *NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.*

G. IMPACT OF THE 2004 ORANGE REVOLUTION ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE AND THE REVIVAL OF UKRAINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt present an argument about the significance of events for the change of international image. They identify three types of events which can contribute to image change: spectacular events, cumulative events and shifts in the policy of governments or mass media.⁴⁸ Spectacular events and their significance for a state's international image change are of special interest for this thesis. Ukraine's Orange Revolution, which ended the Kuchma regime and revitalized interest in Ukrainian integration into NATO and Western democratic society, can be seen as a spectacular event. Scholars disagree about the significance of image changes produced by spectacular events. However, the Ukrainian example proves that spectacular events can have a considerable impact on a state's image. The Orange Revolution and its aftermath considerably altered NATO's view of Ukraine and changed NATO-Ukraine relations.

The Orange Revolution was sparked by the Kuchma regime's electoral fraud during the presidential elections. One of the main slogans of the revolution was "Ukraine without Kuchma!" Kuchma's failures in the international arena were accompanied by lamentable social conditions and poor quality of life for average Ukrainians. After democratically elected Yushchenko became President, the hopes for Ukrainian membership in NATO moved closer to reality. On April 20, 2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer stated in an interview with the *Financial Times* that "membership standards can be much more easily fulfilled by the Yushchenko government than by the former Kuchma government."⁴⁹ The change in NATO's attitude toward Ukraine can be explained by the change of the state's image in the eyes of the Alliance.

Yushchenko's arrival in the Presidential office in 2005 also marked an end to Kuchma's multi-vector foreign policy, which put Ukraine into limbo with no clear or

⁴⁸ Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), edited by Herbert C. Kelman, 135-184.

⁴⁹ Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine moves closer to NATO Membership," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 2, issue 84, April 2005.

concrete foreign policy priorities or strategy. From the very first days of his Presidency, Yushchenko repeatedly declared that the only option for Ukraine's development was full economic and political integration into the EU and NATO. On his visits to Western states, he requested support for Ukrainian endeavors. Clear foreign policy motivations, dedication to a Euro-Atlantic course for Ukraine's development as an independent state, and domestic reforms to fight corruption changed Ukraine's image.

According to Hermann and Fischerkeller, an ally is an actor who is “ready to pursue mutually beneficial economic relations and cooperate in peaceful joint efforts to protect and improve the global environment; [an ally is] motivated by altruism as much as by self-interest.”⁵⁰ Taking this into consideration, Ukraine was never so close to being seen as an ally as in 2005. After 15 years of half-measures and false starts, Ukraine embarked on a path of comprehensive reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration.

At a meeting in Vilnius on April 21, 2005, NATO invited Ukraine to begin Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's prospects for NATO membership. According to NATO's official website,

the formula of Intensified Dialogue has its roots in the 1997 Madrid summit, at which NATO Heads of State and Government decided to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions and relevant reforms.⁵¹

Previous rounds of NATO enlargement showed that Intensified Dialogue is followed by an invitation to implement the NATO Membership Action Plan. The fact that Ukraine was invited to enter into Intensified Dialogue with NATO only four months after the Orange Revolution proves that changes in Ukraine were recognized by NATO, and that NATO is ready to perceive Ukraine as a probable member—in other words, an ally.

The Orange Revolution and the victory of democracy in Ukraine are strong empirical support for Herman and Fischerkeller's argument for the significance of events for international image change. NATO's invitation to begin Intensified Dialogue only

⁵⁰ Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428.

⁵¹ “NATO Launches 'Intensified Dialogue' with Ukraine,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/04-april/e0421b.htm>, accessed 17 November 2006.

four months after the Ukrainian revolution shows how change of image influences the outcome of foreign policy toward the image holder. From a practical point of view, the Ukrainian goal to integrate into NATO had clear chances for success due to the Alliance Open Door policy. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters in April 2005, NATO and its member states stood ready to do what they could to help Ukraine achieve its goals.⁵²

H. EFFECT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE

What took place in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution presents many lessons. The Orange Revolution is part of the popular wave of democratization in Eastern Europe. Political instability in Ukraine following the revolution resulted from the power struggle between the political groups that had propagated the ideas of the Revolution and democratic transformation. The “Orange coalition,” which came to power after the revolution but has since collapsed, consisted of four main political groupings: “Our Ukraine” Party (backed by Yushchenko), Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (headed by Yulia Tymoshenko), Socialist Party (headed by Oleksandr Moroz) and Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (headed by Anatolii Kinakh). Right after the presidential elections, Yushchenko formed the Orange coalition government, appointing representatives of the four political groups. However, all four immediately expressed discontent with the proportional importance of their ministerial mandates; their disagreements rapidly turned into open political confrontation. The President's efforts to mediate and reunite the coalition government were unsuccessful. The new Ukrainian government failed the survivability and professionalism tests due to the confrontational climate. As a consequence, the government was fired by Yushchenko after only seven months.

Such political instability could not be ignored by NATO. Although the new Ukrainian government insured a steady flow of reform focused on integration into NATO, the Alliance leadership was concerned with the political instability. As a confirmation that Ukraine's image was damaged, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop

⁵² “NATO Launches 'Intensified Dialogue' with Ukraine.”

Scheffer stated after his meeting with newly appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine Yurii Yekhanurov in October 2005 that Ukrainian integration into NATO should be a performance based process and not only an events-based process.⁵³

Unfortunately, the great Orange hope became a great Orange disappointment due to immature behavior by the political elite, who missed a chance to further democratic development and whose legitimacy among the Ukrainian people was greatly undermined. As a consequence, parliamentary elections in March 2006 were won by the opposition Party of the Regions of Ukraine headed by Yushchenko's main opponent Victor Yanukovych. Before Yanukovych's appointment as Prime Minister on August 4, 2006, his party openly opposed Ukraine's move to join NATO, describing the process as an inexplicable rush.

However, after Yanukovych became Prime Minister, NATO-Ukraine relations did not suffer complications. Moreover, the newly elected parliamentary deputies, with majority support for Yanukovych, nonetheless ratified the Memorandum of Understanding allowing NATO access to Ukrainian airlift capacity. The ratification of this Memorandum had been on hold since 2004 and did not make it through the previous parliament. NATO's use of the unique and inexpensive Ukrainian airlift capacity benefits Ukraine, from a commercial point of view, and for NATO it is beneficial as well because strategic airlift is a considerable capabilities gap for the European Allies (compared, for example, with the capabilities of the U.S.). Yanukovych and his parliamentary supporters made a positive practical contribution to mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO. Although the Party of Regions of Ukraine had earlier opposed ratification of the Memorandum, it was nonetheless ratified once Yanukovych took office. The new Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament showed an exemplary joint effort on this issue, and Yanukovych's team demonstrated the scope of their influence over Ukrainian foreign policy.

⁵³ Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and H.E. Mr. Yuriy Yekhanurov, Prime Minister, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051007b.htm>, accessed 18 November 2006.

Ukrainian integration into NATO before the next parliamentary elections in 2011 depends greatly on the position of Yanukovych and his supporters in Parliament. Visiting NATO headquarters on 14 September 2006, Yanukovych said there was

no alternative today for the strategy that Ukraine has chosen in its relations with NATO... For Ukraine it is very important to participate in the creation of the new system of European security, and such an opportunity is given to us today with the Intensified Dialogue with NATO and cooperation with NATO.⁵⁴

Asked if Ukraine would join NATO's Membership Action Plan, he responded that because of the Ukrainian political situation, "we will now have to take a pause, but the time will come when the decision will be made."⁵⁵ He did not indicate what kind of decision to expect.

The answer can be inferred from the draft of the Declaration on National Unity of Ukraine and its provisions on NATO-Ukraine relations proposed by the Party of Regions of Ukraine. Creation of the Declaration was a Yushchenko initiative. The document had to incorporate key aspects of Ukraine's development, including its foreign policy, and had to be supported by different political parties. Signing the Declaration was intended to end growing political instability which endangered the integrity of the state. Yushchenko's initial text of the provision on NATO-Ukraine relations stated that Ukraine will "join the NATO Membership Action Plan."⁵⁶ The Party of the Regions of Ukraine proposed modifying it to read, "Mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO, resolution of the question regarding NATO membership via a referendum" or, alternately, "Mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO in accordance with the current version of the Law on National Security of Ukraine. Question regarding NATO membership must be resolved via a referendum. Every necessary step should be taken by Ukraine in this regard."⁵⁷ The rhetoric of this text is open to different interpretations. The final version advocates

⁵⁴ Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and H.E. Mr. Yuriy Yekhanurov, Prime Minister.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ *Declaration of National Unity of Ukraine* (Text Signed at the Round Table), 21 August 2006, available from <http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/8/1/5966.htm>, accessed 12 January 2006.

⁵⁷ *Declaration of National Unity of Ukraine*.

[m]utually beneficial cooperation with NATO in accordance with the “Law on National Security of Ukraine” (in accordance with the version of the law that is current on the day of the signing of this Universal). To resolve the question regarding NATO membership via a referendum, which is to take place after Ukraine completes every step necessary for it.”⁵⁸

The statement regarding joining the NATO Membership Action Plan was removed from the text. Considering that the majority of the Ukrainian population opposes NATO membership, and factoring in the low probability that Parliament would pass new laws on this matter, it is fair to say that Party of the Regions of Ukraine achieved its short term goal of delaying membership in MAP at least until 2011.

Signed the Declaration cooled political tension in Ukraine but did not put an end to political instability. The President's statements of Ukrainian readiness to join MAP are not supported by the Prime Minister, who is backed by the Parliamentary majority and thus has considerable leverage in foreign policy.

In a politically unstable situation, Ukraine's foreign policy motivations again have become unclear and its behavior in the international arena is unpredictable. Consequently, Ukraine's image has suffered, and it is not perceived, as it was in 2005, as a NATO ally. This explains why Ukraine was not invited to join the NATO Membership Action Plan during the Riga summit. Ukraine's chance to become a NATO member is delayed at least until the next parliamentary elections in 2011.

I. CONCLUSION

Since the beginning of NATO-Ukraine relations in 1991, cooperation has been influenced by the Alliance's image of Ukraine. Changes in foreign policy motivations and international behavior, which are the main components of image formation, influenced the evolution of NATO-Ukraine relations starting with the NACC and later the PfP programs, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the invitation to join in Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The fact that Ukraine was not invited to the MAP during the Riga summit is explained by Ukraine's current image,

⁵⁸ *Declaration of National Unity of Ukraine.*

which is marred by unclear foreign policy motivations and unpredictable international behavior. If not improved, this negative image will block the state's integration into NATO even if all official criteria for NATO membership are met.

IV. EFFECT OF NATO MEMBERS' FOREIGN POLICY ON UKRAINE: NATO AND EU INTERDEPENDENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes how particular NATO members' foreign policy towards Ukraine affects Ukraine's integration into the Alliance. NATO is an organization comprising 26 allies. Consequently, the image of Ukraine held by NATO as an organization and the Alliance's policy toward Ukraine results from commonly accepted policy, elaboration of which is based on consensus. Without minimizing the importance of any NATO member, for all practical purposes, the foreign policy of several specific NATO members determine NATO's general policy. The important states include the U.S., Germany, France and Poland.

The current complex situation results from differences among these states on the future of NATO and Ukraine's status. These differences can be explained by divergence in national interests and motivations. The U.S. and Poland, with a rationale for seeing Ukraine as an ally rather than a partner, are the most active advocates for Ukraine's membership in NATO. The reluctance of France and Germany to perceive Ukraine as an ally and to support Ukraine in its endeavors is also dictated by rationale, one rooted in their respective national political and economic interests. Continued U.S. and Polish support will be crucially important for Ukraine's full integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. At the same time, membership will remain blocked if France and Germany do not change their positions.

B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE

American policy toward Ukraine has always been crucially important to NATO's cooperation with the country. The chances of Ukraine joining the Alliance depend greatly on the position of official Washington. The history of U.S.-Ukraine relations demonstrates variations in American interests and strategy. America's initial strategy in establishing relations with Ukraine was characterized by active participation to support Ukrainian development as a stable and democratic European state. Considerable financial assistance to Kyiv during that period can be considered investments, primarily in U.S.

strategic security on the European continent. The history of U.S.-Ukraine relations and the changing U.S. strategy reveal that the U.S. took a lead in shaping NATO's approach to Kyiv, and specifically in securing Ukraine's status as a NATO Distinctive Partner in 1997 and inviting Ukraine to join Intensified Dialogue in 2005.

Changes in U.S. foreign policy can be explained by the politico-psychological realm of international relations theory. Additionally, considerable changes in U.S. strategy after the Orange Revolution provide strong empirical support for the significance of events for image change and the outcome of foreign policy.⁵⁹ Recognition of democratic changes in Ukraine by the U.S. (in contrast to key Western European NATO members) and changes in Ukraine's image had clear justification. America's interest in cooperating with Ukraine was always conscious, with clear goals. At the same time, the importance of Ukraine's image change for the evolution of U.S. foreign policy strategy is obvious.

1. U.S. Policy toward Ukraine, 1991-2004

Immediately following its emergence as an independent nation in 1991, Ukraine fell into the orbit of U.S. strategic interests. As Celeste Wallander puts it,

Ukraine is a key European country with geopolitical importance in Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus. Its location makes it a vital country in geoeconomic terms, as well as a potential trade corridor between Europe and Asia. Ukraine's economy is more diversified than many in the post-communist region, with potential in the energy, defense, scientific-technological manufacturing, and agricultural sectors ... Consolidating Ukraine's future as a democratic country is important to U.S. national interests and requires a strong and sustained strategy.⁶⁰

Among the most obvious rationales for active U.S. engagement with young Ukraine was the need for reliable mechanisms for cooperation with a strategically located new state. Ukraine was a powder keg, having inherited almost 40 percent of the Soviet Union's military equipment. In terms of numbers, there were 1,944 strategic nuclear warheads and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons, 220 strategic nuclear carriers, including

⁵⁹ Herbert C. Kelman, *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 135.

⁶⁰ Celeste Wallander, "Challenge and Opportunity: A U.S. Strategy on Ukraine," *CSIS Publications*, 28 June 2006, available from <http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2005/270514.shtml>, accessed 12 January 2007.

176 land based intercontinental ballistic missiles and 44 strategic bombers (Tu-160 and Tu-95). Conventional forces comprised 6,500 battle tanks, more than 7,000 armored combat vehicles, 1,500 combat aircraft, 270 attack helicopters, 350 combat ships and support vessels, millions of small arms and millions of tons of ammunition. Rapidly initiating mechanisms for cooperation and consultation created U.S. opportunities to further Ukraine's "safe" development as a denuclearized and partly demilitarized state. Appropriate Ukrainian decisions in that direction were supported by large amounts of targeted American financial assistance. This explains why, from 1991 to 1996, Ukraine became the world's third largest recipient of U.S. assistance (after Israel and Egypt) and the number one recipient in former Soviet territory.⁶¹

Did official Washington perceive Ukraine as a probable future member of NATO in the early 1990s? Definitely not. Ukrainian leadership and diplomats rejected the idea repeatedly, even opposing the first round of NATO enlargement.⁶² Further, the U.S. and other Western nations indicated that Ukraine was not a candidate for NATO membership.⁶³ This demonstrates that at first Ukraine was not perceived as a probable ally but rather as a partner requiring assistance with stable and safe democratic development. The transition to democracy requires time and considerable reforms.⁶⁴ Accordingly, the initial strategy of the U.S. toward Ukraine was not focused on Ukraine's integration into NATO.

Later, on the eve of the first round of NATO enlargement, U.S. foreign policy and its vision of Ukraine's place had not changed considerably. In 1998, American foreign policy and international relations analyst Robert J. Art claimed that

⁶¹ Leonid I. Polyakov, "U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability," 18, available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=590>, accessed 22 December 2006.

⁶² Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 122.

⁶³ *Basic Papers on International Security Policy*, April 1996, no. 16, available from <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP16.htm>, accessed 31 January 2006.

⁶⁴ Burkhard Koch, "American and German Approaches to East Central Europe: a Comparison," *World Affairs*, September 1993, available from <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-14728649.html>, accessed 11 January 2007.

NATO can expand without alienating Russia and endangering Ukraine. The special deals cut with these two – the founding Act with Russia and the NATO-Ukraine Charter – will square the circle. Both states will be kept organically out of NATO but intimately tied to it. Moreover, NATO's expansion must be limited and, preferably, stopped, if Russia's cooperation is to be secured ... that is exactly what the United States and its allies risk if they next induct the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO.⁶⁵

This view reflected the left wing of the U.S. Democratic Party during NATO enlargement between the Madrid invitations of 1997 and the actual first round of enlargement in the spring of 1999.⁶⁶

At the same time, when Ukraine asked for U.S. support to strengthen NATO-Ukraine relations and bring them to a qualitatively new level in 1996, the U.S. response was positive. Official Washington understood that institutionalization of NATO-Ukraine relations could help prevent Ukraine's reincorporation into a Russian-dominated security structure—a scenario that would cast the shadow of Russian power on the Polish border with major implications for Alliance defense planning.⁶⁷ The U.S.-Ukrainian Commission, created in 1996, worked on these ideas from Kyiv; as a result, at the 1997 Madrid summit Ukraine became a NATO Distinctive Partner. This status opened considerable opportunities for Ukraine to conduct an independent foreign policy and receive more benefits.

Between 1997 and 2004, U.S. policy toward Ukraine was characterized by cautiousness. Official Washington perceived Ukraine during those years as dominated by President Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” supporting him. The U.S. repeatedly expressed concern about Ukraine's fitful economic reforms, widespread corruption, and deteriorating human rights record.⁶⁸ The first Ukrainian declaration of its NATO membership aspirations in 2002 was cautiously welcomed by the U.S. The odds of

⁶⁵ Robert J. Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 113, No. 3, Autumn 1998, 385, available from <http://navynps.library.ingentaconnect.com/content/taps/psq/1998/00000113/00000003/art00002>, accessed 28 August 2006.

⁶⁶ Asmus, 122.

⁶⁷ Asmus, 159.

⁶⁸ “Ukraine: Current issues and U.S. policy,” *CRS Reports for Congress*, 23 August 2006, available from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/73991.pdf>, accessed 12 January 2007.

America supporting Ukraine for NATO membership in 2002 were extremely low because of a series of quarrels between national leaders in 2000-2001. The Kulchuga-gate scandal, followed by an exchange of unpleasant “compliments” between Washington and Kyiv, are the most obvious. At the same time, while not backing Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, Washington continued to provide considerable economic assistance.

Therefore, U.S. foreign policy during the so-called “post-communist syndrome” from 1991 to 2004 was based on the strategic interests of the U.S. and its European allies in making Ukraine safer and building the foundation for a stable democracy. Approaching U.S. foreign policy during that period from the perspective of political psychology, one can say that American foreign policy was based on the perception of Ukraine as a partner. Assistance was practically intended to keep Ukraine from becoming an unpredictable or even a rogue state.

2. U.S. Policy after the 2004 Orange Revolution

Significant changes in U.S. foreign policy and a switch in the American position on Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership after the Orange Revolution are strong empirical support for how events affect both images and foreign policy.⁶⁹ Why did the U.S. recognize and actively support democratic transformations in Ukraine? There is no doubt that a helping hand from the U.S. demonstrated yet again America’s devotion to liberal democratic values. Even America’s negative experience with Ukraine under Kuchma did not slow efforts to consolidate democracy and improve relations with Kyiv.

Starting in 2004, U.S. interest in Ukraine grew rapidly, accompanied by qualitatively new strategic goals reflected in increasing American scholarly publications and Congressional Research Service reports. The new U.S. strategy advocated Ukraine’s integration into the family of Western democracies and NATO, and called on the EU to provide similar support and “open the door” to Ukraine.⁷⁰

American scholars said that Ukraine must become a priority for the United States. Wallander wrote,

⁶⁹ Kelman, 135.

⁷⁰ “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and U.S. Policy,” *CRS Reports to Congress*, 1 April 2005, 7.

Ukraine is a priority not only for ... strategic reasons, but also because U.S. credibility is at stake: if the United States cannot sustain a serious strategy for Ukrainian development and integration, it is difficult to see how it can do so for countries with less economic potential, weaker democratic institutions, and further removed from vital European allies.⁷¹

Robert Wexler, a member of U.S. House of Representatives, said in 2005, “I hope the Administration will discuss the likelihood and timetable for Ukraine joining NATO.”⁷² Although U.S. support does not guarantee success, American endorsement is very important.

The new U.S. strategy was still based on conscious interests and clear foreign policy objectives, with a clear rationale to see Ukraine as an ally rather than just a partner, and to advocate Ukrainian membership in NATO. The rationale can be explained by a rift between key Western European powers and the U.S., which began when the Soviet threat disappeared and became clearer in recent years.

The second Iraqi campaign by a U.S.-led coalition led to open criticism of the American foreign policy by key European allies and EU trendsetters Germany and France. Given Germany and France's political and economic potential and importance in shaping EU policy, when they change their view of the traditionally strong American position, it has the potential to become reality.

Europe remains the most important and indispensable U.S. partner in all significant global issues in the new century – the global environment, international development policy, high technology, etc. The EU has the population base, the economic and technological capabilities, and the cultural and political attributes of a global power. In Joseph Nye's terms, Europe has the “soft power” that increasingly determines international influence in the postmodern world.⁷³ Energizing American efforts toward

⁷¹ Wallander.

⁷² Comments by Representative Robert Wexler before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, “Ukraine: Developments in the Aftermath of the Orange Revolution,” 27 July 2005, 2, available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intrel/hfa22653.000/hfa22653_0.HTM, accessed 28 August 2006.

⁷³ Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 3.

Central and Eastern Europe to strengthen the U.S. position on the continent is a logic step for Washington. The case of American-Polish relations is the best of several examples of U.S. success in this direction.

America's position on the necessity of integrating Ukraine into NATO and the EU does not look like a request that the European powers shelter a “poor cousin” against drifting back to authoritarianism. Ukraine's strategic location and economic, political, scientific and military potential are strong arguments against key European powers reluctance to accept democratic changes in the country. Concretely, Ukraine's unique strategic airlift capabilities could resolve a major problem of European NATO members related to the capability gap between them and the U.S. Moreover, Ukrainian military potential and strategic airlift capabilities are far from superfluous for the EU's long term process of creating a common European military force. Therefore, by supporting Ukraine's membership in NATO and EU, the U.S. both supports Ukrainian strategic goals and simultaneously strengthens its own position with a probable NATO member.

In light of Alliance difficulties reaching consensus on major decisions, Ukraine, if accepted in NATO, might become a close supporter of NATO's main protagonist, the U.S. In this context, it should be noted that U.S. concerns about intra-Alliance divisions, revealed after 2003, grew to the point that the Senate asked President George Bush to raise the issue of changing NATO's consensus rule. One possible approach to the evolution of decision making in NATO is to empower “coalitions within NATO.” This approach would mandate that the NATO Committee of Contributors, comprised of Allies prepared to contribute forces to operations, carry out operations on behalf of NATO.⁷⁴ Considering the U.S. support of Ukraine's aspirations for NATO membership and the reluctance of the European Allies to extend the same support, Ukraine would logically become a member of a U.S.-led “coalition” within NATO.

Of course, the scenario of coalitions within NATO is not all that likely. In its history, NATO has managed to withstand serious crises, and its “margin of safety” will allow it to weather the current situation. At any rate, Washington and Kyiv share mutual

⁷⁴ Leo G. Michel, “NATO Decision Making: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?” *Strategic Forum*, No. 202, 2003.

interests in Ukrainian membership in NATO, which explains why the U.S. changed its image of Ukraine from a partner to an ally and changed its policy toward Ukraine and Ukrainian hopes for NATO and EU membership.

3. U.S. Policy after the 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Ukrainian Parliamentary elections in 2006 revealed internal political instability. Fruitless and debilitating disputes inside the Orange coalition, in power less than 15 months, impeded progress in implementing a coherent reform program after the revolution. As a result, voters handed pro-Western parties a defeat, giving 32 percent of the vote to the Russia-backed Party of the Regions. This was a wake-up call for the U.S. David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, said in June 2006, “The positive atmosphere [towards Ukraine] at NATO ... has dissipated in the face of several factors.”⁷⁵ Those factors include the vision of NATO-Ukraine relations described by the head of the newly-formed government. Underlining the necessity of developing mutually beneficial cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, Yanukovych rejects the idea of near-term membership in NATO.⁷⁶ Although Yanukovych bases his argument on negative public opinion on the issue, and NATO membership would probably fail to pass in a national referendum, his rhetoric is not the sort welcomed by the U.S. or NATO. The fact that NATO and member states' leaders always assign great importance to rhetoric also explains the reaction of Washington and the change in atmosphere towards Ukraine. Words, like actions, have consequences, and language becomes part of generally accepted political reality.⁷⁷

However, American foreign policy has not changed in ways which could affect the strategy and interests of U.S.-Ukraine relations. Importantly, official Washington responded positively to the formation of the Yanukovych government in August 2006. The new permanent government took Ukraine out of the limbo it had occupied since the

⁷⁵ “NATO Gets Cold Feet on 2008 Enlargement,” Reuters, 3 July 2006, available from <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03599675.htm>, accessed 28 August 2006.

⁷⁶ Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

⁷⁷ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 6.

March elections. A State Department spokesman said that the U.S. would work with the new government, given that it came to power in a democratic way. Nevertheless, American analysts believe that the U.S. will watch closely to see if the new Ukrainian government will try to reverse progress in democratization and other areas.⁷⁸ Official Washington will keep an eye on developments within Ukraine, and what they see may change elements of U.S. foreign policy, although not U.S. strategy in general.

Tracing the chronology of U.S.-Ukraine relations, one can see how America's strategy and interests changed over time. Changes in U.S. policy, influenced by the evolving Ukrainian image, greatly affected NATO's proposed form of cooperation. Efforts by Washington allowed Ukraine to become NATO Distinctive Partner and join an Intensified Dialogue. As the main proponent of Ukrainian membership in NATO, the U.S. will continue to play a crucial role. At the same time, the invitation for Ukraine to join the NATO MAP will depend primarily on Ukraine's persistent pursuit of necessary reforms along with the position of European allies, especially Germany and France. Without appropriate support by key European powers, Ukrainian membership in NATO will not become a reality.

C. NATO-EU INTERDEPENDENCE AND EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD UKRAINE

European reaction to Ukraine's aspirations provides further evidence of NATO-EU interdependence. The ambivalence of EU and its key powers regarding exactly what type of relationship it wants with Ukraine is a serious obstacle to Ukrainian membership in NATO. Western European reluctance to recognize transformations in Ukraine, to change their view of the state and to support Ukraine for NATO and EU membership have a clear justification. The causes of ambivalence (almost antagonism) are both political and economic. The political background is the continuous policy of key European powers to maximize their influence and political weight in Europe and the world. The economic background, indissolubly tied to energy security, is the close economic connection of France and Germany with Russia. Reluctance to support Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO to the detriment of relations with Russia is the key

⁷⁸ Steven Woehrel, "Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. policy," *CRS Reports for Congress*, 23 August 2006.

European allies' main economic reason. However, keeping the door to NATO closed against Ukraine, even for the long term, means the European allies indirectly create favorable conditions for the Kremlin to regain influence over Ukraine. As a result, reluctance to recognize democratic transformations in Ukraine and to perceive it as an ally, which is based primarily on national interests, partly nullifies U.S. and Polish support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors. The situation is a serious obstacle to Ukrainian integration into the family of Western democracies.

1. France's Position

France has never directly expressed either support or opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO. At the same time, the French position on the future of NATO as a practical matter blocks Ukrainian membership. U.S. proposals for further enlargement of the Alliance and creation of new mechanisms for cooperation with Australia and Asian countries were blocked by Paris on the eve of NATO's Riga summit in 2006. By opposing further Alliance transformation in general, France makes Ukrainian membership in NATO improbable.

At the same time, one can see France's rationale for not perceiving Ukraine as an ally within NATO and EU. Official Paris understands that in regards to Ukrainian membership, the U.S., as the main proponent of NATO enlargement, will strengthen its standing in Europe. In 1996, President Chirac said, "My ambition is for the [European] Union to assert itself as an active and powerful pole, on an equal footing with the United States of America, in the world of the twenty first century, which ... will be a *multipolar* one."⁷⁹

Competition with the United States for a leading international role is rooted in the idea of France's grandeur, of a strong and powerful France which "must lead a global policy in the centre of the World," in De Gaulle's words.⁸⁰ The development of European

⁷⁹ Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 2000), 130.

⁸⁰ Menon, 130.

Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the EU, where France has strong political and economic standing, serves French national interests in achieving “equal footing” with the U.S. as an influence in Europe.

French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie explains French objections to the U.S. proposals on the eve of the Riga summit, stating that

the development of “global partnership” would risk diluting the natural solidarity between Europeans and North Americans … and above all, send a bad political message: that of a campaign, at the initiative of the West, against those who do not share its conceptions.⁸¹

Therefore, France's reluctance to support Ukrainian membership in NATO is part of its general obstruction of any NATO transformation which might threaten the international standing and influence of the EU in general and of France in particular.

Another reason France does not support Ukraine's aspirations is its unwillingness to damage its developing relations with the Russian Federation. A Polish-Lithuanian proposal to change EU-Ukraine cooperation (from the European Union Politics of Neighborhood policy to another, with long-term prospects for EU membership) was cautiously supported by Germany but rejected by France. One of the French arguments was the uncertainty of official Paris on how Russia would react.⁸² France assigns special importance to its relations with Russia based on national interests, especially economic and energy interests.

Recognizing France's political weight in the EU and its ability to influence NATO internal processes, Russia created considerable economic incentives to enlist France's political support in the sphere of international relations. These economic incentives revolve around the stability of Russian energy resource supplies to Europe and France in particular. Specifically, two French companies, “Total” and “Elf”, have traditionally been among the largest buyers of Russian crude oil and oil products. “Total”

⁸¹ “France Blocks NATO Bid to Create a Global Terror Force,” *The Independent*, 4 November 2006, available from <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article1953750.ece>, accessed 26 January 2007.

⁸² “France Fears Putin, Obstructs Ukraine's Association with European Union,” *Maidan Inform*, 7 February 2005, available from <http://eng.maidanua.org/static/enews/1107727382.html>, accessed 11 February 2007.

was one of the first to invest in the newly opened Russian oil industry, opening the possibility for France to participate in developing the giant Russian oil fields. One of the best examples of French involvement in the Russian oil industry is the fact that “Total” owns half of the shares in the huge, rich Kharyaga field in Nenets territory in the Timan Pechora basin.⁸³ Recent rumors of the withdrawal of the company’s license for the Kharyaga project even caused the French Foreign Ministry to intervene. Foreign Minister Philip Douste-Blazy said in September 2006, “I really hope that the good relations between France and Russia translate very quickly into the possibility for “Total” to continue its whole program in Russia.”⁸⁴ Putin’s statement that the rumors were exaggerated calmed the situation.

In addition to the existing cooperation, France plans to participate in developing another giant untapped gas field in Russia known as Shtokman field. With 300 million cubic meters of gas located in the Barents Sea, it has the potential to become Russia’s major gas source for both internal and export markets. France’s “Total” is one of four international companies involved in development of this challenging gas field, with production expected to begin in 2010.⁸⁵ Considering that all of Europe depends on Russian natural gas (50 percent of imports) and oil (30 percent of imports), French efforts to strengthen economic ties with Russia will not meet strong objections from most EU members.⁸⁶

To summarize, France’s ambivalence about relations with Ukraine and Ukraine’s future status in NATO and EU can be explained by national political and economic interests. While it wants equal footing with the U.S. in world affairs, France is satisfied

⁸³ “Energy Cooperation between France and Russia: A Solid Base and Bright Perspectives,” Moscow International Petroleum Club, 4 February 2006, available from <http://www.mmnk.org/journal/said.htm>, accessed 30 January 2007.

⁸⁴ “France Demands Total Support over Oil License,” *St. Petersburg Times*, 26 September 2006, available from http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=18945, accessed 30 January 2006.

⁸⁵ “Energy Cooperation between France and Russia: A Solid Base and Bright Perspectives.”

⁸⁶ “Russian Oil Cut-Off Prompts Europeans to Look for Alternatives,” CNS News, 10 January 2007, available from <http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200701/FOR20070110c.html>, accessed 22 January 2007.

with NATO's current composition, tasks, roles and missions, and resists NATO transformations that might negatively affect French international standing. Ukrainian membership in NATO is perceived by France as strengthening the U.S. position in Europe. Reluctance to damage relations with Russia is another explanation for France's negative attitude towards further NATO enlargement and Ukrainian membership. These strong reasons and French opposition make Ukrainian prospects for membership in NATO practically unlikely.

2. Germany's Position

The position of Germany on Ukrainian membership in NATO is no less important than the position of France. Unlike France, Germany participates in NATO's military wing and thus is better integrated in NATO institutionally. Moreover, Germany's active support for the first round of NATO enlargement greatly determined the successful integration of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance. In regards to the German position on Ukrainian NATO membership, official Berlin welcomed democratic transformations in Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic orientation of its foreign policy. At the same time, in contrast to official Washington, the German leadership did not openly express a positive or negative view of Ukrainian membership in NATO. Nevertheless, several factors indicate that Germany does not have adequate reason to perceive Ukraine as a probable ally within NATO. Moreover, keeping the doors of both NATO and EU closed would better serve German national interests and is more rational for Germany than support for Ukraine.

The history of NATO expansion after the Cold War revived German interest in the scope of the Alliance's enlargement. A position paper drafted by a German inter-ministerial working group in 1994 named the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic) as preferred candidates for parallel enlargements of NATO and EU and rejected collective admission of other aspiring countries.⁸⁷ Germany took great interest in expanding NATO and EU to protect itself from potential

⁸⁷ Frank Schimmelfennig, *NATO's Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-Making*, EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Report, 2000, 40.

instability in Central and Eastern Europe. As former German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe stated during Bundestag debates on NATO enlargement in 1994,

The opening of the Alliance to the East is in our vital interests. One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this ... A situation where we are at the border of stability and security – stable here but unstable east to us, prosperity on this side but poverty on the other side of the border – such a situation is not tenable in the long run. It is for this reason that Germany's eastern border can not be the border of NATO and the European Union. Either we will export stability or we will end up improving instability.⁸⁸

Ukraine, not a part of the Visegrad group and not a German neighbor geographically, is one of the other aspirants whose membership in NATO does not especially serve German national interests. It is obvious that the reason for actively advocating Czech, Hungarian and especially Polish membership in NATO cannot be applied to Ukraine. Moreover, Berlin understands that Ukrainian integration into NATO will require considerable political and economic assistance for NATO membership-oriented reforms. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, such assistance is justified by German national interest, especially in the security sphere, but the same cannot be said of Ukraine. For these reasons, Germany is ready to perceive Ukraine as a partner with democratic transformations and a West-oriented foreign policy but not as a probable ally. Assistance to Ukraine is not seen as a justified burden.

Another clear rationale for not accepting Ukraine as an ally within NATO and EU comes from Germany's unwillingness to support Ukrainian endeavors that might harm relations with Russia. Like France, Germany has recently been active in developing relations with Russia to serve national interests in the economic and energy spheres. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who signed the initial agreement with Putin to construct the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), is now chairman of the NEGP consortium. German companies “BASF” and “E.ON” together own 49 percent of

⁸⁸ Volker Ruehe, Speech during the Parliamentary Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1994, quoted in Asmus, 30.

the consortium shares.⁸⁹ It is intended that the pipeline cross the Baltic Sea to directly connect Russia with Germany. The project faces strong opposition from six European Union member states (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic) and is considered an economic threat to Belarus and Ukraine. If the project is implemented, Belarus, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Ukraine will lose their status as transit states and the accompanying financial benefits.

For Germany, NEGP is advantageous because it would make Germany the primary distributor of Russian gas in Europe. The pipeline will transport gas primarily to Germany with further distribution to the rest of Western Europe, as well as to the former transit countries. For Ukraine, which now sees 80 percent of Russian gas pass through its territory en route to the EU, the consequences of this project are predictable: Ukraine will lose considerable financial benefits and its strong political leverage with Russia. Given the considerable financial and political benefits for Germany from the NEGP project, its implementation essentially makes Germany and Ukraine serious competitors in the energy sphere. If Ukraine joins NATO and the EU in particular, Germany risks gaining another “dissenter” like Poland, which in 2006 vetoed the start of talks on a new economic and energy partnership between EU and Russia.⁹⁰

Germany’s reluctance to support Ukrainian integration into NATO and EU has a clear rationale. Germany does not want to threaten its relations with Russia by supporting Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, considerable political support and economic assistance to Ukraine would not be as well-justified by national foreign policy motivations as were such expenditures in the first round of NATO enlargement. Supporting Ukrainian integration into the EU, Germany also risks gaining an economic

⁸⁹ Ariel Cohen, “The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe’s Energy Security,” *Backgrounder*, No. 1980, 26 October 2006, available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/upload/bg_1980.pdf, accessed 9 January 2006.

⁹⁰ “Russia: Poland Holds Up EU Partnership Talks,” Radio Free Europe, 14 November 2006, available from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/c5bd7c33-b982-4360-9617-62bb2ffb8ac3.html>, accessed 9 January 2007.

competitor and a dissenter. As a result, although Germany welcomes Ukraine's democratic reforms and pro-Western foreign policy, keeping the doors of both NATO and EU closed better serves German national interests.

3. The Importance of Polish Support

Like the U.S., Poland is an active advocate for Ukraine in NATO and EU. The fact that Poland is a reliable American ally and supports Washington's foreign policy is not the only explanation for Warsaw's position. Poland's interest in Ukrainian membership in both NATO and EU is similar to the interest of Germany in Polish membership in these institutions in the 1990s. It is obvious that Poland would prefer as an eastern neighbor an ally fully integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions over expansion of Russian influence on its border. This explains Poland's changing perception of Ukraine from a partner to an ally and Poland's immediate advocacy for Ukraine's entry into NATO. Considering the growing role of Poland in NATO and EU, Ukraine should take advantage of Poland's support.

In 2002, when Ukrainian authorities announced their desire to join NATO, Warsaw officials immediately expressed approval. Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated that "Poland will continue to be active in supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine."⁹¹ Polish support is important for Ukraine because Poland belongs to NATO and the EU, where it managed to rapidly consolidate its position after acquiring member status in 2004.

Poland's growing importance as a regional actor is one of the most striking developments since the late 1990s. According to analysts, Poland has the best performance among new NATO members.⁹² Historically, Poland was an influential state in Central Europe. To play a leading role in the region today, as well as within the Alliance over the long run, Poland has consciously sought a strategic partnership with the United States. With U.S. political and economic support, Poland has gradually moved to

⁹¹ Aleksander Kwasniewski, Address by the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, at the Welcoming Reception at the Presidential Palace, 23 September 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020923b.htm>, accessed 7 January 2007.

⁹² Stephen Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Pittsburg: RAND Publications, 2003), 42.

achieve its strategic goal and is the strongest U.S. ally in Central Europe today. Even while it was acquiring the EU member status, Poland, unlike EU trendsetters Germany and France, supported the U.S.-led second campaign in Iraq and contributed a significant military contingent to the coalition force. Also unlike most European countries, Poland supported Bush's plans for missile defense and is willing to provide a radar site for a theater missile defense system.⁹³ The current status of U.S.-Poland relations guarantees American support for Poland's increasing self-confidence and status in Europe. At the same time, the availability of a strong European ally and EU member helps Washington preserve its strong political standing in Europe.

In February 2006, Poland's newly elected President Lech Kaczynski expressed his support for Ukraine's membership in NATO, saying his country hopes to see Ukraine join NATO in 2008. At the same time, he urged Russia to drop its ideas of a "zone of influence."⁹⁴ It is notable that Kaczynski's statement came a month after a conflict between Moscow and Kyiv that began when Russia stopped natural gas supplies in mid-winter until Ukraine agreed to pay twice the price. Like other European states, Poland reacted immediately. France, Germany and Italy encouraged Kyiv and Moscow to find a solution quickly, but Poland raised the alarm, alleging that Moscow was using its energy resources as a political weapon to influence "intractable" Ukraine. Poland was among the first to point to the Russian threat to EU energy security. A recent rift in Belarus-Russia relations, caused by a repeat of the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict the year before, demonstrates that Polish alarm is well founded. Poland, which irritated key European powers France and Germany with its veto of EU-Russia economic and energy talks, has a strong argument for maintaining its position.

In addition, an overwhelming majority of Polish people would like to see Ukraine as a NATO and EU ally. According to polls conducted by the Public Research Laboratory of Poland in January 2007, 76 percent of respondents support Ukraine's

⁹³ Larrabee, 42.

⁹⁴ "Poland's Kaczynski Backs Ukraine's NATO Bid, Seeks Better Ties with Moscow," *Moscow News*, 8 February 2006, available from <http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/02/08/kaszynsky.shtml>, accessed 3 January 2007.

accession to NATO and EU.⁹⁵ Such positive results can be explained by the fact that Soviet domination is still fresh in the minds of Polish people. Poland's leadership has social support for advocating Ukraine's membership in NATO, which indicates that Poland will continue to support Ukraine.

Polish support for Ukraine is based on a clear rationale. In addition to supporting U.S. foreign policy on the future of NATO, Poland wants to see Ukraine as a future member of NATO and EU based on its own national interests. Therefore, it is likely that Poland's support will continue to be strong. Ukraine, in aiming for NATO membership, should take advantage of this support and study the domestic reforms that helped Poland gain its own membership in NATO.

D. CONCLUSION

NATO members' images of Ukraine, as well as their position on the potential for Ukrainian membership, influence NATO's common policy towards Ukraine. The positions of the U.S., France, Germany, and Poland essentially determine the future of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors. The U.S. and Poland actively support Ukraine's acceptance into NATO because it suits their national interests and vision of the Alliance's future. The same can be said of the ambivalence of France and Germany. U.S. and Polish support will continue to be crucial for Ukraine's future status in NATO and EU, but Ukraine will remain blocked if the positions of France and Germany do not change.

⁹⁵ “The Majority of Polish Population Support Ukraine’s Entry into the EU,” *Follow News*, 20 January 2007, available from <http://follow.net.ua/news/stuff/232678/240>, accessed 27 January 2007.

V. UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION: THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO NATO MEMBERSHIP

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on Ukrainian society's distorted and negative image of NATO. Even unanimity among NATO members to accept Ukraine into the Alliance will not guarantee success. Given negative Ukrainian public opinion, a national referendum on joining NATO, which is a prerequisite for membership, would probably fail. Negative public opinion undermines the sincerity of Ukraine's leaders when they assert the country's dedication to joining NATO.

Stereotypes and fears about NATO explain the negative perception of the Alliance by Ukrainian society. Anti-NATO propaganda, spread within the population for political purposes, keeps old stereotypes and fears active and creates groundless new myths that heavily influence public opinion and can keep the average Ukrainian from making a rational choice on the referendum on Ukraine's bid to join NATO.

Notably, almost half of Ukrainians consider themselves poorly informed about NATO. A clear failure by state authorities is responsible for the public's poor understanding of NATO, its post-Cold War transformation, current tasks, roles and missions, as well as the reasons NATO membership is the main priority of Ukrainian foreign policy. Without a well organized and smoothly conducted information campaign, Ukraine's main foreign policy task faces failure.⁹⁶

B. POLL RESULTS

Between 2002, when Ukraine first declared a desire to join NATO and 2006, when the question of Ukrainian membership was actively discussed within NATO, public opinion polls show that support for NATO membership has decreased while opposition has increased.

⁹⁶ Nikolai Sungurovskii, "Ukraine-NATO: Problem of Conscious Choice," *Kiev Mirror Weekly*, 2 December 2006, available from <http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/625/55262>, accessed 11 January 2007.

Attitude toward Ukraine's Membership in NATO	Percentage of population
Positive attitude	27
Negative attitude	38.8
Would not vote in the referendum	13.4
Difficult to say	20.2
No response	0.6

Source: *Oleksander Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies*

Table 2. Public Opinion on Ukraine's Integration into NATO (2002)⁹⁷

As Table 2 shows, in 2002, a third of the population (34.2 percent) had no clear opinion on whether to support the state's bid for NATO membership. Ukrainian experts believed that most of the undecided would support NATO membership if an appropriate information campaign were conducted. To that end, they composed, coordinated and received state approval for a "State Program on Informing the Population about Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Integration" between 2004 and 2007. The program contained clear goals, mechanisms for implementation, and expected results.

However, the program did not function as expected. More recent polls demonstrate that it failed to increase the number of pro-NATO voters as expected. In fact, a renewed anti-NATO propaganda campaign resulted in a decrease in support for the policy.

Attitude toward Ukraine's Membership in NATO	Percentage of population
Positive attitude	23.5
Negative attitude	65.1
Difficult to say or no response	11.4

Source: *National Academy of Science of Ukraine*

Table 3. Public Opinion on Ukraine's Integration into NATO (2006)⁹⁸

⁹⁷ "Public Opinion on Ukraine's Integration into NATO," Oleksander Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 24 December 2002, available from http://www.uceps.org/eng/opros/15/?show_q_id=13&idTema=0&m_razdel=102, accessed 29 January 2007.

⁹⁸ "Sixty-five Percent of Ukrainian Population are Against Integration into NATO," *RBK Ukraine*, 27 November 2006, available from <http://www.rbc.ua/rus/newsline/2006/11/27/147345.shtml>, accessed 22 January 2007.

Despite prevailing negative public opinion, the majority of Ukrainian experts support NATO membership.⁹⁹ Practically, this means that Ukraine's entry into NATO is supported by those who are best informed about NATO. So, what about the population? According to the polls conducted in November 2006 by the Oleksander Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 43.1 percent of the population consider themselves poorly informed about NATO; only three percent of respondents say they have a high level of awareness of NATO.¹⁰⁰ Vladislav Yasniuk, director of the Foreign Ministry's NATO-Ukraine Relations Department, reports that polls conducted by his ministry in October 2006 show 24 percent of Ukrainians completely unaware of what NATO is.

The urgent necessity for an effective information campaign is obvious. The campaign should not only explain why joining NATO is the main priority of Ukrainian foreign policy; it should also destroy old stereotypes and fears about NATO nurtured by anti-NATO propaganda with no rational foundation.

C. MAJOR STEREOTYPES INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION

Anti-NATO propaganda campaigns conducted for political purposes nurture old stereotypes and fears from the Cold War years and create new ones which also affect public opinion. There are three major stereotypes that influence public opinion on NATO membership. In these stereotypes, NATO is seen as an enemy, NATO is seen as a block seeking Ukrainian territory, and NATO membership is seen as a heavy burden on the Ukrainian budget.

1. NATO Perceived as an Enemy

The stereotype about the hostile face of NATO is probably the most important and persistent. It is rooted in the Cold War and propaganda against NATO operations in Yugoslavia which emphasized the bombardment of fellow Slav Serbians and the expulsion of Orthodox people from their homes. Ignorance of the history of the conflict plays a major role here. The facts that Serbian armed forces started military operations

⁹⁹ Sungurovskii.

¹⁰⁰ "Ukrainians Lack Information about NATO," *Inter News*, 28 November 2006, available from <http://www.podrobnosti.ua/society/2006/11/29/372395.html>, accessed 3 January 2007.

and that the NATO operation was a response to atrocities against the Albanian Muslim population were surely not included in such propaganda. The same can be said about the odds that the situation in Serbia will become a large scale uncontrolled regional conflict with ethnic and religious overtones.

Poor awareness of NATO keeps the average Ukrainian from recognizing that former Yugoslav republics are current or aspiring NATO members. Better information on NATO's transformation and enlargement could help Ukrainian society to understand that these former Yugoslav republics are not "dissatisfied" with their NATO involvement. The fact that Serbia wants NATO membership is probably the best argument in this regard.

2. NATO Perceived as Seeking Ukrainian Territory

A second stereotype, involving NATO's purported plans to occupy and deploy troops in Ukraine territory, is also strong and actively exaggerated by those who spread anti-NATO propaganda. The Block of Natalia Vitrenko, which failed to win three percent of the vote in 2006 and thus does not qualify for a seat in Parliament, is extremely active in diffusing these fears. Hoping to regain its lost position, the Block is especially active in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians comprise a considerable share of the population. The Block is even more active than the Communist Party of Ukraine, which just barely amassed the three percent of the vote necessary for representation in the Parliament.

In anti-NATO speeches, government opponents frequently accuse Ukrainian leaders of trying to bring NATO troops into the state and violating provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution that prohibit the stationing of foreign troops on Ukraine territory. However, the authors neglect several facts. First, a foreign military base already exists in Ukraine, belonging to the Russian Black Sea fleet. Second, people probably do not know that NATO has no permanent military force, only one which is offered by allies and partners and constituted specifically for the conduct of concrete military operations. Anti-NATO propaganda neglects this information, so people hear about NATO only as a potential occupier. Again, insufficient knowledge about NATO and active distortion of facts play a negative role.

Another example of a distorted information campaign is the activity of the Russian Nationalist Youth Organization “Proryv” in the Crimean peninsula. Two deputies of the Russian Duma were declared persona non grata in Ukraine after they visited the Crimean peninsula and delivered speeches in support of “Proryv.” Funding sources for such organizations are difficult to track. However, the fact that their activities are backed by Russian politicians speaks for itself.

3. NATO Membership Perceived as a Heavy Burden on the Budget

The myth that NATO membership is a heavy economic burden also derives from anti-NATO propaganda. Although Ukraine demonstrates relatively steady economic development, the welfare of the average Ukrainian citizen remains poor. State social services are also in need of improvement. That is why arguments regarding a heavy economic burden from NATO membership, though false, catch the attention of average Ukrainians. Supposedly well-informed pseudo-analysts even proclaim that NATO membership will cost 92 billion hryvnias (roughly 19 billion U.S. dollars). Notably, they do not indicate the duration and type of such expenditures.¹⁰¹

Again, poor awareness of NATO keeps the average Ukrainian from recognizing that national contributions to the NATO budget are fixed on the level of one-half to one percent of a nations’ military (but not social) expenditures. Real expenditures for the implementation of the State Program on Euro-Atlantic Integration are 204 million hryvnias (roughly 40 million U.S. dollars), which comes to approximately 60 kopecks (12 U.S. cents) per adult per month. Moreover, 90 percent of this is reimbursed by the United Nations Organization for Ukraine’s participation in international peacekeeping operations.¹⁰² Anti-NATO propagandists’ awareness of Ukrainian society’s concerns and weak points helps them distort information to attract the attention of average citizens.

Besides these three major stereotypes, there are weaker and more irrational ones, like the idea that neutrality is the best option for Ukraine. Only a well planned and smoothly conducted campaign that attracts public interest can help the average Ukrainian

¹⁰¹ Sungurovskii.

¹⁰² Serhii Fesenko, “NATO is Not a Problem, Problem is the Ukraine’s Relations with Russia,” *Follow News*, 28 November 2006, available from <http://follow.net.ua/news/view/189080>, accessed 9 January 2007.

to make a rational democratic choice. This in turn will help guarantee that anti-NATO myths and “fairytales” will not affect Ukrainians’ decisions during the national referendum on NATO membership.

D. RUSSIAN IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

As a clear example of how concerns about Russia influence public opinion, 80 percent of Ukrainians are concerned about the possibility of worsening Russian-Ukrainian relations if Ukraine joins NATO.¹⁰³ Russia traditionally opposes any Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO and tries to influence Ukrainian foreign policy using leverage possible, including its natural gas supplies to Ukraine. When in April 2005 NATO invited Ukraine to begin Intensified Dialogue, there was a surge of anger from Moscow and increased inflammatory statements by Russian politicians. The official Russian position was announced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, who said, “We have said more than once that every country has the right to take sovereign decisions on who will be its partner in the international arena.” At the same time, he added that the acceptance into NATO of Ukraine would mean a colossal geopolitical shift, and Russia would assess its options based on its own national interests.¹⁰⁴

The official statement was followed by statements from other politicians who, unlike Lavrov, showed a lack of ethics and diplomacy. As a consequence, ten Russian politicians, including Vladimir Zhirinovskii, a Vice Speaker of the Russian Duma, were declared “persona non grata” for their interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. The most staggering example of interference came with the arrival in Ukraine of another deputy in the Russian Parliament, Konstantin Zatulin, who actively participated in a 2006 anti-NATO demonstration organized by the Block of Natalia Vitrenko. For this, he was given the same status as his colleague Zhirinovskii.

¹⁰³ Fesenko.

¹⁰⁴ David McDuff, “Moscow’s NATO Line,” *A Step at a Time*, 8 June 2006, available from <http://halldor2.blogspot.com/2006/06/moscow-s-nato-line.html>, accessed 8 January 2007.

Average Ukrainians worried about relations with Russia are not sufficiently aware of NATO-Russia cooperation. Improved awareness of the facts about Russian cooperation with NATO could significantly contribute to opening their eyes to the credibility of anti-NATO propaganda disseminated by Russian-backed groups.

The facts demonstrate that Russia outdoes Ukraine in several important types of cooperation with NATO, even considering that Ukraine is in the process of Intensified Dialogue. So, unlike Ukraine's "26 plus 1" format of "consultations" with NATO, Russia participates in "making decisions" with the Alliance, specifically in the area of fighting terrorism. In contrast to five working groups functioning within the format of NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), the NATO-Russia Council counts 20 working and expert groups.¹⁰⁵ Other facts demonstrating practical cooperation between NATO and Russia would also surprise the poorly informed average Ukrainian. To cooperate in fighting terrorism, Russia allowed NATO aircraft to use its airspace for operations in Afghanistan. Within the same framework of cooperation, Russia and NATO have established mechanisms for intelligence information exchange. Based on the provisions of an Action Plan set up by the NATO-Russia Commission, Russia participates in the NATO antiterrorist operation "Active Endeavor" in the Mediterranean. In September 2006, the Russian corvette "Pytlivyi" patrolled the Mediterranean Sea jointly with the Turkish frigate "Geksu." A Ukrainian role in the same operation, meanwhile, is limited by the contact point in Ukrainian Navy Headquarters in Sevastopol, and participation by the Ukrainian corvette "Ternopil" is still in the planning stages.

It should also be mentioned that since June 2004, the Ukrainian Parliament has failed to ratify a Memorandum of Understanding allowing NATO access to Ukrainian airlift capacity. While the Ukrainian Parliament considered for two years whether it should make friends with NATO and ratify the memorandum, the Russian company

¹⁰⁵ Volodymyr Kravchenko, "Russia-NATO: Not a Love-Match but a Marriage of Convenience," *Kyiv Mirror Weekly*, 23 September 2006, available from <http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/615/54600>, accessed 12 January 2007.

“Volga-Dnepr” took an interest in providing the same services for the Alliance. As a consequence, the Russian company provides 50 percent of airlift services requested by NATO.

Other facts about NATO-Russia cooperation—Russia’s participation in NATO exercises, NATO’s support for the Program of Adaptation of the Russian Retired Officers at a rate of 400,000 Euro per year,¹⁰⁶ etc.—also exemplify how the state can pursue national goals in cooperation with NATO. Russian cooperation with NATO might even serve as an example for Ukraine.

Returning to how the Russian factor influences Ukrainian public opinion on NATO, anti-NATO propaganda is reflected in another very interesting fact. According to the polls, the share of Russian population with a negative image of NATO is 60 percent.¹⁰⁷ Considering that Ukrainians with similar views make up 65 percent of the population (five percent more than in Russia), the success of the anti-NATO propaganda campaign probably was a surprise even for its organizers.

These realities point to the urgent need for an effective public information campaign about NATO. In the future, an objective description of NATO-Russian cooperation should probably be included in the Ukrainian State Program on Informing the Population on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration. Depicting the benefits to Russia from its active cooperation with NATO could show Ukrainian society why Russia so strongly resists any Ukrainian rapprochement with the Alliance. This would greatly contribute to the fight against anti-NATO propaganda and to reversing the NATO’s negative image among Ukrainians.

E. CONCLUSION

The negative image of NATO held by the majority of Ukrainians will block the main strategic goal of Ukrainian foreign policy, membership in NATO, even if all NATO

¹⁰⁶ Kravchenko.

¹⁰⁷ Kravchenko.

members unanimously support Ukraine's bid to join Alliance. This reinforces the fact that membership in NATO depends primarily on the state's willingness and ability to integrate into the organization.

Negative public opinion means that a national referendum would probably fail, so reversing the negative image of NATO should be a priority for the state leadership. The task appears complicated because of multiple negative stereotypes of NATO. These stereotypes, nurtured by anti-NATO propaganda in Ukraine, will prevent the average Ukrainian from voting rationally in the referendum. A well-timed and smoothly run information campaign can show Ukrainians the sources and goals of anti-NATO propaganda. In response to anti-NATO propaganda, information on the scope of NATO-Russia cooperation should be included in the information campaign. The information campaign so far has had unexpected negative consequences, including dramatic growth in opposition to NATO membership. Ukrainian authorities should learn a lesson from this, as continued failure to change public opinion in the near future might create an even greater problem: a turn back toward Russia that would preclude Ukraine's chances of developing as an independent state.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

Having begun gradual rapprochement with NATO since independence, Ukraine today faces considerable difficulties with its bid for NATO membership. While continuing to pursue an open door policy, NATO hesitates to invite Ukraine to the Membership Action Plan and does not see Ukraine as a potential member despite repeated statements by the President in favor of NATO membership and considerable democratic advances and reforms. The fact that more than half of Ukraine's population has a negative image of NATO aggravates the situation. If the negative perception of NATO by Ukrainians is not reversed, a national referendum on NATO membership will certainly fail.

The problem of images in NATO-Ukraine relations can be explained by turning to the politico-psychological realm of international relations. The chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations shows how the evolution of Ukrainian foreign policy motivations and changes in its international behavior changed how the Alliance perceived Ukraine. Changes in the image of Ukraine, from a near-degenerate to a partner and probable ally, are reflected in changed cooperation formats proposed by NATO over the history of the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

The fact that NATO does not see Ukraine as an ally is caused by Ukraine's internal political instability, which is reflected in unclear foreign policy motivations and international behavior. The legitimacy of statements by Ukraine's President Yushchenko asserting the high priority given to joining NATO is regularly undermined by Prime Minister Yanukovych, who is backed by the majority of the Ukrainian Parliament. Insofar as membership in NATO depends on the aspirant's determination and ability to integrate fully into the organization, this uncertainty at home will surely prevent NATO from inviting Ukraine to NATO Membership Action Plan.

Further institutionalization of Ukraine's relations with other Western democracies is crucially important for the state's self-concept and development as an independent

stable democracy. NATO's Open Door policy represents a unique opportunity for Ukraine in this regard. Unless it is integrated into NATO and the EU, Ukraine risks a return to political, economic and military domination by Russia.

Practically speaking, Russian domination would eliminate Ukraine as an independent state and international actor. The U.S. and Poland, the main advocates for Ukraine's membership in NATO, have several times expressed concerns in this regard. Guided in relations with Kyiv by their foreign strategy and conscious interests, American and Polish leaders continually stress their hope that Ukraine will be a strong and independent state fully integrated into NATO and their willingness to provide considerable support toward this goal. At the same time, they encourage the EU and its key members to keep the European Union door open for Ukraine as well. Without Western European support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors, political and economic assistance to Kyiv from Washington and Warsaw will remain inefficient.

Major European powers' reluctance to see Ukraine as a NATO ally and EU member derives from their resistance to NATO transformation and enlargement. France and Germany's unwillingness to accept Ukraine in NATO and EU to the detriment to relations with Russia is another serious obstacle. Further marginalization of Ukraine would undermine the legitimacy of EU's support for democracy and raise the general question of the "finalité Européenne."¹⁰⁸ Moreover, marginalization of Ukraine creates favorable conditions for Russia to extend its political and economic influence to the eastern borders of the EU. Would this be beneficial for the European Union? It is a big question.

However, unanimity within the members of NATO would not guarantee Ukraine NATO membership if another major problem, the distorted and negative image of NATO held by Ukrainian society, is not resolved. Active anti-NATO propaganda, the main cause of NATO's poor public image, nurtures stereotypes and fears about Ukraine's

¹⁰⁸ "The EU's Human Rights and Democratization Policy: Funding Activities to Promote Human Rights and Democratization," available from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#9, accessed 14 January 2006.

integration into the Alliance which preclude a rational, conscious decision in the required national referendum. Efforts by the Ukrainian government to inform the public about Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration have obviously failed.

B. THE WAY AHEAD

The future of Ukraine as an independent state is in question. That is why full integration into NATO and the EU should remain Ukraine's top foreign policy priority. Resolving problems related to joining NATO is primarily Ukraine's responsibility. However, without the support of NATO and EU members, Ukrainian intentions risk failure.

How Ukraine is perceived by NATO will block NATO membership even if all membership oriented reforms are successfully implemented. Overcoming Ukraine's internal political instability and maintaining the dynamics of comprehensive internal reform are crucially important.

Given the tension between negative public views toward NATO and Ukrainian leaders' drive to insure NATO membership, reversing NATO's negative image must be priority so that anti-NATO propagandists do not continue to exert a negative impact. The importance of the "Russian factor" on public opinion suggests that Russia's active cooperation with NATO should be a focus of the public information campaign.

Ukraine must take full advantage of strong support from the U.S. and Poland, lest the Western countries develop "Ukraine's fatigue" like in 2000-2001 during Kuchma's rule. The experience of Poland and other new NATO members should be thoroughly studied by Ukrainian authorities and experts.

Given the ambivalence of key European allies, Ukraine should reinvigorate dialogue with the European powers. If the European door to NATO remains closed, Ukraine's main foreign policy priority will not be achieved.

Ukraine's path to Euro-Atlantic integration is a rocky one. The situation is difficult but not hopeless. Of course, Western support is crucial. At the same time, Ukraine's determination to do its homework is the key to success.

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